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PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC LANDS
By B. Delworth Gardner

Introduction

The federal government owns and controls more than 4 7 percent of the
land in the Western United States'. The Interior department has jurisdiction
over approximately 450 million acres, most of it used primarily for livestock
grazing and is managed by the Bureau of Land Management. The federal
forests, managed by the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture,
contain about 325 million acres and include some of the prime timbergrowing lands in the world. Vast acreage's are also found in the national
parks and Indian reservations. Most of federal land is used by recreationists
of many types and is a valuable watershed for the country as a whole. All of
these factors create complex fiscal and management relationships between
the federal government and state and local governments and between the
government and people who reside in the region.
A common belief held by the region's citizens, and especially the
politicians, is that the region is subservient to and victimized by the rest of
the nation. Whether it is water, grazing, timber, mineral, energy fuel, or
recreation policy, the heavy hand of the federal government dominates local
interests to a degree not experienced by other regions of the country. .
In this paper I will discuss one of the issues that has slowly been
building in the West since the 1930s, but which reached its zenith in the
"sagebrush rebellion" movement of the 1970s; namely, whether or not the
federal government should dispose of the public lands in the West. Both
transferring them to the states and complete privatization have been
considered.
At the most fundamental and philosophical level this question revolves
around using markets and the private sector as a substitute for political
allocations of resources necessitated by public ownership. I have written
elsewhere about the potential for establishing markets for water allocation
and the extensive political controls on the use and retention of prime
agricultural lands. a
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It has often been alleged that natural resources like land and water
are more "social" than other resources and therefore that markets fail to
allocate these resources efficiently. Private property rights in natural
resources are attenuated giving rise to a host of "externality", "public good",
and "common property" market failures. The conventional reaction by
economists to market failure is to advocate corrective intervention through
2

the political process. That is, parties affected by market failure will pressure
surrogate political representatives to internalize these impacts and regulate
the economic system in a socially optimal manner. The public choice
theorists have demonstrated, however, that the political system seldom
works in this idealized fashion, and that these political fixes are themselves
susceptible to failure in the form of wasted resources.4 In the end, therefore,
whether or not political intervention is more or less efficient than the
unregulated market is an empirical question that must be informed by the
evidence of each individual case.
5

Ownership and Management of the Federal Lands

Forty-four percent of the public land is located in Alaska and 92
percent is in the 12 Western states including Alaska and excluding Hawaii.
Five of the 12 states have over 50 percent of their acreage in federal reserves,
and only Washington has less than 33 percent.
The reasons for the recent flap over ownership and control of the
public lands are not hard to discern. Until the last three decades use control
of the public lands resided largely in the regional commodity users: ranchers,
miners, loggers, and irrigators. Favorable policies to these groups were
assured by pressure brought on political representatives in Congress and the
executive branch.
Beginning in the 1960s, however, the politics began to change
dramatically due to two main factors: 1) the demand for recreation and
amenity goods increased sharply, and 2) the new and increasingly powerful
environmental-conservation movement learned how to manipulate the
political allocation process both directly and through judicial rulings. It was
correctly perceived by the traditional commodity interests that the balance of
power was shifting to their detriment. It was not only that quantities of
federal grazing and allowable timber cu ts were reduced. In general, there
was a paralysis of policy that greatly increased uncertainty for the
traditional users. Most proposals to develop resources on the public lands
were either rejected outright or delayed for years in court actions and
bureaucratic regulations that greatly increased operating costs.
The
Endangered Species Act is probably the most damaging legislation affecting
traditional users. The timber industry in the Northwest has been decimated
by rulings that the preservation of the spotted owl required a cessation of
harvesting old-growth timber.
There were also some large economic rents from energy and mineral
development to fight over. Since most of the monetary and environmental
costs of development are borne locally, it seemed only fair that a larger share
of the revenues and royalties should be allocated to state and local
governments.
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The upshot of disaffection with federal control of resources coupled
with the arrogance of federal bureaucrats attempting to enforce regulations
culminated in legislation in many Western states that transferred ownership
and control of the public lands to the states. This has been referred to as the
"sagebrush rebillion." Of course, the federal government found this action
ludicrous on its face and a constitutional confrontation seemed apparent.
But then the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1982 derailed the
rebellion, at least temporarily. He was a Westerner; a conservative who
believed in both development and states-rights. He and Interior Secretary
James Watt were expected to reverse the pro-environment, anti-development
policies of the Carter administration and thus mitigate most of the objections
to federal management and control.
Recently, the focus among states in the region seems to have shifted to
the alleged mismanagement of the public lands, how serious it is, and what
might be done about it. The most compelling case for inefficient federal
management was made by libertarian and public choice economists, who
argued that mismanagement is inevitable with public ownership and can
only be eliminated if decisions are placed in the private hands of efficient
profit ma:ximizers. 1 Although this might be partially accomplished by longterm leasing of the public lands and by the use of market processes in
resource allocations (such as open auctions for grazing, timber, energy fuels,
and minerals), the most simple and most effective cure would be divestiture
of the public grazing lands, not to the states but to private owners.
6

Some economists have advocated disposal of the forest and park lands
as wells and some believe the proceeds should be used exclusively to retire
the national debt.
It is instructive to review in some detail arguments as to
why political allocations fail to be efficient compared to market allocations.
9 10

To quote from Sowell, "An economic system is a system for the
production and distribution of goods and services. But what is crucial for
understanding the way it functions is that it is a system for rationing goods
and services that are inadequate to supply all that people want. This is true
of any economic system, whether it is called capitalism, socialism, feudalism,
or by any other name." This reminder of the basic function of an allocative
system is a fruitful point of departure for comparing production and
distribution decisions under continuing federal land retention with those
that would likely exist if federal divestiture occurred.
Non-Price Political Allocations

As a general proposition, if resources are privately owned and goods
and services are produced for market sales, two conditions must be satisfied
if the producing firm is to be a viable entity. At the price charged for the
product, consumers must believe that the product is worth more than the
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price or no sales would occur. On the other hand, the seller must be able to
earn a profit or the firm cannot be viable in the long run. These conditions
mean that there will be competitive pressures for the resources to be used
efficiently in the interests of both consumers and producers. Private owners
of resources could be expected to be sensitive to the amount of wealth they
own and their allocation decisions will generally be consistent with
maximization of their wealth.
Given the fact of resource scarcity it is not possible for all desired uses
of the resources to be simultaneously satisfied. Some rationing must occur,
some denial of competing uses. Private producers operating in markets use
price as the mechanism of denial. In other words, if consumers cannot come
up with the price an exchange does not take occur. If producers did not use
price denial, they must sacrifice wealth.
11

Public land managers do not use price to deny access to resources,
except in the rare cases where user fees (prices) are used. Other rationing
processes and criteria that are essentially political are utilized instead.
Usually these are laid out in bureaucratic rules and regulations, such as
sustained-yield and multiple-use, which will be discussed later. This is not
to say that public managers are not subject to pressures that attempt to
influence their decisions. In the public decision arena the potential
recipients of the benefits from a decision may pressure, cajole, and otherwise
attempt to affect the allocation process. They expend resources in the
process. In the absence of bribery, however, the public manager receives no
monetary payoff that resembles a price.
Instead, he may receive
approbation, good will, and support for his continuing employment from
those on whom he bestows his favors.
The crucial question is whether or not political allocations can be
efficient in terms of using resources in ways that consumers desire. One
answer that has been given is that in a representative democracy the purpose
of government is to advance the public interest. Political decision makers
operate in political markets where "implicit" prices are generated in the form
of votes, lobbying, campaign contributions, etc. But how do we know that
this political market is economically efficient in producing the bundle of
multiple products from the public lands and in stimulating investment in
resource maintenance and improvement? The answer relies partially on a
priori reasoning on the nature of political decisions and partially on
empirical studies of government management.
Governments per se don't make decisions, people employed by the
governments do. As the public choice theorists have long argued, agency
people are like the rest of us and can be expected to make decisions
consistent with their self-interest. This does not rule out altruism if being
altruistic adds to individual satisfaction. 12 It is almost needless, however, to
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argue that the success of an individual employed in a bureaucracy is
inextricably linked to the success of the bureau itself, defined in terms of
bureau size, budget, power, and influence. Contrary to what occurs in a
private firm, a political decision-maker is seldom in a position to gain
personally from reducing agency cost or selling a product to those who value
it most highly. Both are essential to economic efficiency. The incentive
structure in government decisions is not even remotely compatible with
efficiency norms.
13

It is useful to think of agency decisions about the public lands as a

"commons" that, in theory, is accessible to all, but in practice, access is
proportional to influence and power. Those who are allocated products at
subsidized prices or for no price at all tend to be relatively few in number and
are generally located conveniently to the public lands. Since what they get is
worth more than they pay directly, their economic surplus is likely quite
large, and they find it in their interest to invest in order to keep the surplus
as large as possible. We observe them mobilizing into special interest groups,
investing in lobbying, making political campaign contributions, and using
propaganda to increase the probability of decisions being made in their favor.
The nation's interests become synonymous with their interests, or so they
claim. It is commonly observed that if an agency official holds out against
these interests, sufficient power exists to see that he will be replaced by
another who will be more cooperative. 14
These political manipulations run counter to efficient resource
allocation. One reason is that groups competing for political favors see
themselves as antagonists whose uses are incompatible and mutually
exclusive. This has two significant consequences: 1) pressure is exerted for
decisions that tend toward single rather than multiple uses that may be more
efficient, and 2) the competition for capture of the political decision wastes
resources that could have been used to produce alternative beneficial
purposes and therefore represents a dead-weight social loss.
Looking at the problem from a financial viewpoint, the ultimate losers
of this wasteful political process are the taxpayers. Because user fees are
seldom set at competitive levels and often are zero, management costs for
recreation, forestry , and grazing, for example, are higher than revenues,
which implies taxpayer subsidies. Then why don't the taxpayers do
something about it? Because most of them are located far from the public
lands, and as individuals they have a comparatively minor interest in how
these land are used. Given that the costs to them as individuals of becoming
informed about these complex problems are far higher than the small
benefits captured, they remain "rationally ignorant" and largely uninvolved
in the allocation decisions. This makes it easy for the concentrated special
interests to dominate political decisions.

6

The legislation of recent years, as implemented by the public land
agencies, does not require efficient management. The 1974 Renewable
Resources Planning Act, the 1976 National Forest Management Act, and
especially the 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act may stress the
importance of scientific management, and may advocate comparing costs and
benefits from investment in resources, and other practices that seem to be
directing the agencies toward efficiency objectives. The reality, however, is
that the supreme management goals repeatedly stressed in the legislation
are multiple-use and sustained-yield, both of which are hurtful to economic
efficiency.
If multiple-use were interpreted as requiring that combination of
multiple products that maximizes the net aggregate joint value of these
products through time (assuming the tools and data were available to value
all products), the concept would have an efficiency ring to it. But, without
prices, how can these valuations be made? What costs should be netted out
in estimating net value? Valuation of both outputs and costs presents
tremendous difficulties for an agency managing the public lands. Therefore,
in practice, multiple-use is simply a political nostrum that several classes of
users have a valid claim to the public lands. It is the stamp of approval for
political allocations that do not force the public managers to face the hard
allocation decisions. Perhaps that is why miners, energy producers, timber
harvesters, and graziers appear to like the concept. It is their license to use a
parcel of public land whether or not that use is economically important. In
fact, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Section 103) seems to
specifically reject economic efficiency norms by defining multiple use as--"the
management of the public lands and their various resource values so that
they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and
future needs of the American people .... with consideration being given to
the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to the combination of
uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output."
Sustained-yield as interpreted is equally empty of economic content. It
is usually taken to mean that the resources should be managed to insure that
the biological yield of the resources is constant through time. But efficient
economic yield is a function of expected prices, expected real interest rates,
and taxes as well as biological yield. In some cases, it may be economically
efficient to use up the entire biological stock and then grow another, a
common occurrence with most agricultural crops. Obviously this practice
would be contrary to the philosophy of sustained-yield.
16

Generating an efficient level of capital for investment in resource
conservation and improvement is a formidable problem for the federal land
agencies. Discretionary investment resources originate from two sources:
appropriations and user fees. Economic efficiency criteria are seldom, if ever,
utilized by Congress to appropriate investment funds. Log-rolling and pork-
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barreling are essentially political activities unrelated to economic yield. It is
true that some user fees are directed to resource conservation and
improvement, but there is little evidence that the allocation process is based
on an economic evaluation. 16 To make matters worse, during the Nixon, Ford,
and Carter administrations, the agencies were generally hostile to any
private investment on the public lands.
Likewise, empirical studies are uniformly critical of agency
management decisions when measured by economic efficiency criteria. The
national forests are "underharvested" 11 18 19 20 and yet there is "overinvestment"
in cultural practices to grow new timber and to construct roads to make
harvests possible. 21 Overgrazing of the Indian reservations is pervasive and
results from a failure of the Department of Interior and the Tribal Councils
to enforce property rights and adopt a program to limit grazing. Grazing
permits issued to ranchers at fees below the value of grazing are misallocated
because of eligibility requirements that militate against economic efficiency.
Range improvement practices, particularly rest-rotation widely utilized by
the BIM and chaining used by the Forest Service, are not cost-effective.
Multiple-use managerial constraints on the National Forests are so serious
as to "dissipate all opportunities for timber managerial discretion and
optimization." The list could be extended almost ad infinitum.
22
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Surely the case is a very strong one that agency decisions are
inefficient under public land ownership. But could private owners do any
better if divestiture occurred? How significant would market failure be under
private ownership? We turn to these issues next.
Divestiture and Market Allocation

The essential notion of divestiture is to permit private parties to own
and control the land itself. This means that fundamental control of land use,
parcel size, land transfers, harvest decisions, productivity improvements,
etc., would be placed in private hands. What would be the outcome? We can
logically infer some expected results.
As suggested above, divestiture would create incentives for production
of those outputs that can be profitably traded in markets. Of course, those
now using the public lands on heavily subsidized terms may expect their
income and wealth to be affected. Under privatization use denial would be
accomplished by the price system. This does not mean, however, that present
users would necessarily be worse off in the long run. Once the initial wealth
redistribution effect worked itself out, equity would cease to be so important
an issue with market-traded goods, since presumably no free-market
exchanges would occur unless both buyer and seller believed the trade would
make them better off.

8

Under private ownership the multiple-use issue would be of little
consequence, except where public goods are produced. Pure public goods are
those whose consumption is not exclusive and where access is difficult and
prohibitively costly to control. 21 If access to consumption of the good cannot
be controlled, prices cannot be charged, and the market will not provide the
efficient quantity since investment resources cannot be acquired. Open space
and some visual amenities are example of public goods produced on public
lands. However, it is not obvious that these goods would be produced in
smaller quantities under private than public ownership. For example, if
Mount Timpanogas were privately owned would any less of it be available for
viewing than is now the case.
For market goods, owners will maximize their wealth in the resources
by matching their production with the preferences of consumers for various
products.
Price is the coordinating vehicle in providing information.
Efficient product diversity would be forthcoming as producers responded to
the effective purchasing power of the demanders. It is highly probable that
products would be more diverse, prices (fees) would be more variable, and
many more consumers would be served under private ownership than are
currently being served under public ownership. Consumers and taxpayers
would have better information and greater incentive to acquire it, and their
current rational ignorance would be displaced by an active knowledge of the
available products and prices.
Management decisions would be fully accountable and constrained by
the need for revenues to cover costs in the long run. Resource productivity
could be expected to increase and enhanced conservation would occur as
private owners would be unfettered by regulations currently constraining
public managers. The private capital market would supply the resources for
all investments that promised positive net returns. Significantly, the risks
associated with current political management would disappear. Various
types of agreements, covenants, easements, and other instruments would
clearly define property rights and reduce risk.
Baden and Stroup have demonstrated why private management is
superior to public management in conserving resources. In establishing
conservation guidelines elected officials do not see much beyond the next
election. Future generations are not here to vote their interests in the polling
booth. Bureaucrats are whiplashed by political forces that have great
urgency in the present. By contrast, privately-owned resources will tend to
be owned and controlled by those most optimistic about the future. Present
wealth in land and renewable resources is the market's expected value of the
discounted flow of valuable future products. Optimists see higher future
values than pessimists and bid away resources. In economic markets, future
generations are represented by entrepreneurs who profit from conserving
resources for their expected use.
2
"
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Some Criticisms of Divestiture and Market Allocation

None of the above should be construed to imply that divestiture can be
easily accomplished. A significant problem is the potential for fraud and for
special and discriminatory treatment in the disposal process itself. If
political allocation cannot be efficient, why should we expect that political
disposal will be either efficient or equitable? The government has a long
history of fraudulent and inequitable distributions of minerals, energy, land
and water. This is a legacy that will be difficult to deal with in trying to
convince the public that it might be different in disposing of the public land.
One of the most obvious objections to private ownership and market
allocation of products from the public lands is that market goods will be
priced at competitive levels rather than received free or at highly subsidized
prices as they are now. It would appear that gainers and losers are easy to
identify: 1) private owner-producers would presumably gain and the local
economy would benefit from the extra income generated from better
management and market pricing; 2) present bureaucrats would lose and
presumably would have to change jobs or move elsewhere; 3) local
governments would gain or lose depending on whether local taxes were
higher than the fraction of current user fees received; 4) national taxpayers
would gain by eliminating costly subsidies and the inefficiency of public
ownership and management; and 5) consumers of products might either lose
or gain as indicated below.
How can consumers gain if market products are to be priced at
competitive levels? The reason is that under public management products
are not free nor as subsidized as appears. Someone must pay for those
lobbying, campaign contributions, propaganda, and court costs that are
incurred in order to influence public decisions. The funds come largely from
dues to environmental organizations and so-called check-off levies assessed
by commodity associations. It is conceivable that privatization and market
allocation at a price would be both more efficient and more equitable. Each
consumer would pay for what he gets. Because resources would be more
productive and variety would increase as products were tailored toward
consumer tastes, the value of outputs to consumers would increase.
Let us now turn to sources of market failure embodied in privatization
as mentioned above: public goods and externalities. There do appear to be
some problems with divestiture if public goods cannot be marketed and
externalities are not accounted for in negotiated private decisions.
Because price denial is not the rationing system used for allocating
most products from the public lands, it is understandable that market prices
for these products do not now exist. The appropriate question is: could and
would they be priced and efficiently allocated under private ownership? The
correct answer is yes, at least for all nonpublic goods, which would include all
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recreation where access can be cost-effectively controlled. Already we have a
wide variety of private markets in hunting, fishing, camping, skiing, boating,
swimming, etc.
By definition, market transactions do not permit the interests of nonnegotiating parties to be included. If it were costless to bring third parties
into the negotiations they would be brought in, and no problem would exist. 30
Unfortunately, these transaction costs are often prohibitive. To quote Sowell:
"Political systems allow third parties to influence economic transactions from
which their interests are excluded. Political decision making can lower
transaction costs by allowing a relatively few surrogates to make and
implement decisions reflecting the will of millions who have insufficient
stake (or resources) to incur the huge costs of devising and transacting some
of the decisions they believe in." Granted, but how significant the external
interests are and how well the surrogates (the politicians and bureaucrats)
represent them in political decisions are really empirical questions.
Water is an excellent example of a product where external effects may
be significant. Most of the fresh water in the West utilized for municipal and
industrial purposes, irrigation, and recreation originates from precipitation
on the public lands. The condition of the watersheds is critical to runoff rates
and water quality. Do not these facts imply that society has an overriding
interest in these watersheds that mandate continued public ownership?
There are several reasons for doubt.

It is by no means clear that water yields and water quality would be
lower under private ownership. Both yield and quality can be easily
measured and monitored and marketed. Timber production and range
condition, both positively related to watershed yield, might well be superior
under private than public ownership.
Perhaps equally important, mechanisms exist that would internalize
much of the external problem if it got out of hand. Appropriative water
rights are separated from the land anyway and are determined by the date of
filing. Most of the streams originating on the public lands are already fully
appropriated and rights are sanctioned by state law. If private land owners
disturbed these rights in any significant way, they would be liable under the
law and subject to court action. My own guess is that conflicts over water
rights might be far less serious if the public lands were privately owned than
they are now under federal ownership. The threat of a law suit might deter
private land owners from socially deleterious actions that do not phase public
decision makers.
What about fugitive resources, such as wildlife, that cannot be
circumscribed by private boundaries?31 Doesn't this require a public landlord
to protect these resources? Not at all. Hunting and wildlife harvests are
reasonably site specific and the access of hunters is largely controllable.
11

Already in some places ranchers have discovered that user fees they charge
hunters for crossing private land in order to hunt on public lands exceed
income from ranching. They justify collecting these fees as compensation for
wildlife grazing on their private lands, which they can't cost-effectively
control. It may be that habitat for wildlife would be different under private
than under public ownership, however. It is conceivable that thousands of
private entrepreneurs, marketing hunting and fishing privileges, might well
manage the resources more efficiently to produce and retain wildlife in areas
under their control. It already happens in other sections of the country and
in other countries.
Another worry with private ownership of the wildlands of the West is
that corporate bureaucrats in large firms of the private sector are remarkably
like public agency bureaucrats in the public sector and, thus, there would be
few gains from trading one set for another. De Alessi32 has convincingly
argued that this is simply untrue. Private and public organizations differ in
the cost of transferring ownership shares. An individual can change his
"ownership" portfolio of public benefits only by moving from one jurisdiction
to another. This is far more costly than buying or selling securities, his
portfolio of private ownership. Thus, property rights in public organizations
may be taken to be nontransferable. Therefore, the owner's incentive to
detect and inhibit undesirable managerial behavior is much weaker in public
organizations than in private firms, and gives government decision makers
greater opportunities to increase their own welfare relative to that of the
owners.
Finally, objections to private ownership have been raised because the
resulting income distribution is unacceptable. What seems to be bothering
people 33 is that price denial rather than other forms allegedly discriminates
against the poor who cannot come up with the price. The result of price
allocation is to make the distribution of income and wealth less favorable to
the poor. But these objections have been made without proof of any kind. It
is well known that the bulk of the users of the public lands, especially most
recreational users, are not low-income citizens. As a rule, their incomes are
higher than the average of all taxpayers. Thus, current public land
allocation methods transfer income and wealth away from the poor and
toward the non-poor.
Conclusion

Because of a healthy public skepticism about the potential for fraud
and give-away, I am doubtful that disposition of the public lands on a large
scale is politically feasible at the present time. But economists are often very
poor at assessing political feasibility. Most of the efficiency gains are
prospective and many of the beneficiaries do not even know who they are.
Current users would be threatened by privatization unless the disposal policy
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were clearly favorable to them. For these reasons, I am doubtful that a
significant constituency for disposal presently exists. In my view, we must
have more evidence that an efficient and equitable disposal policy is
available.
I propose that we begin with a small disposal program and be creative
in trying alternative schemes. Perhaps long-term competitive leasing as
proposed by Clawson should also be tried on an experimental basis. A
public nonprofit corporation operating under a charter that would require it
to raise and sustain private capital and that would permit it to make all
managerial and investment decisions could also be attempted on an
experimental basis.a~ At the very minimum, opportunities should be sought
to price ration the products from the public lands after the manner now
utilized for timber. This would be a significant, if limited, step toward
improving the efficiency of resource allocation.
3
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Author Note

Some of the material in this paper dealing with divestiture of the
public lands is taken from the author's chapter, "The Case for Divestiture of
the Federal Lands," in Rethinking the Federal Lands, edited by Sterling
Brubaker, and published by Resources for theFuture, Washington, D.C.,
1984, pp. 156-180 and in ''Market vs Political Allocations of Natural
Resources in the 1980s," Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 8 (2),
1983.
About the Author

B. Delworth Gardner is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Brigham
Young University and a member of the Sutherland Institute's Research
Advisory Board. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted,
provided the author and the Sutherland Institute are cited.
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